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 1 
What the United States (US) says in press releases and public statements are not always aligned 
actions, and it is more than a perception problem. The disparity between action and speech 
confuses the signals for both current and potential allies, as well as their enemies over how to act 
to maximize the potential benefits for aligning action and perception. If actions do not align with 
words, the United States potentially alienates its allies and further radicalizes those being fought. 
The reason to be concerned by this is that it potentially undermines any long-term efforts taken 
by the US and its allies to reverse the tide of terrorism sweeping the planet. In a 2009 speech by 
President Obama in Cairo, he said the following:   
We meet at a time of great tension between the United States and Muslims around the 
world -- tension rooted in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate … 
So long as our relationship is defined by our differences, we will empower those who 
sow hatred rather than peace, those who promote conflict rather than the cooperation that 
can help all of our people achieve justice and prosperity.  And this cycle of suspicion and 
discord must end. I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United 
States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, 
and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in 
competition.  Instead, they overlap, and share common principles -- principles of justice 
and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings. I do so recognizing that 
change cannot happen overnight.  I know there's been a lot of publicity about this speech, 
but no single speech can eradicate years of mistrust, nor can I answer in the time that I 
have this afternoon all the complex questions that brought us to this point.  But I am 
convinced that in order to move forward, we must say openly to each other the things we 
hold in our hearts and that too often are said only behind closed doors.  There must be a 
sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; 
and to seek common ground.
1
 
 
Since 2010, the United States has made a greater effort to use rhetoric in a manner that seeks to 
stop perceived targeting of Muslims to one that specifically targets violent, often Muslim, 
extremists. More precisely there is an effort, however successful, to have the perception reflect 
the reality that America is attacking those with direct ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This shift 
in rhetoric has promoted a broader engagement based on mutual respect and aligned interests, by 
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making clear that the targets of America's efforts and those of its allies are against enemies of 
both the United States and mainstream Muslim communities worldwide.  
However, as will be explained further on, while the language has changed the practices 
are primarily continuations and expansions of the earlier "hard" counterterrorism policies and 
their legal foundations. Of particular concern is how various efforts have been taken to stabilize 
and strengthen weakened states, and in some cases going so far as to enact the foundational 
aspects of state building. That is actions that both attempt to alleviate underlying problems 
promoting involvement in terrorism, as well as providing the means for these states to be more 
self-sufficient in combatting those terrorists that exist in their country. 
While directly attacking current threats to the governments and citizens of the US, its 
current and potential allies are important; it does not remove the reason for the terrorist 
proliferation. To this end, this paper will endeavor to delineate how state building should be the 
United States overarching mission in the realm of anti-terrorism efforts. First, state building will 
be examined; the foundational military based efforts will be discussed. The civilian efforts, 
bolstered by location specific knowledge of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which will 
build on a militarily constructed framework that will be enumerated; after this the importance of 
having rhetoric align with actions will be more fully detailed, as a disconnect may further strain 
operational successes and exacerbate failures.  
Once these sections are concluded, the current and potential structure of the US military 
will be detailed. This is not done to infer that either the US or specifically are the center of state 
building efforts, but because the US posses the resources, knowledge, and ability to take the lead 
in this task, but in order to do so without possibly undermining its other security interests, it 
becomes necessary to fundamentally change the structure of its military. The final part of this 
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shift toward a more comprehensive joint state building undertaking is a brief discussion of two 
things that have a great potential to undermine the proposed change, use of contractors both 
military and civilian groups and the present application of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), by the US currently and possibly by others in the near future.  
Will the various proposed changes allow the United States to continue what is presently 
working and keep itself and its allies safe, all the while dispensing with practices that detract 
from progress made, particularly those with impediments to long-term gains? By doing this the 
author endeavors to provide a comprehensive solution to a complex, multifaceted problem, in a 
way, that maximizes present and future attempts to remove contributing factors that lead to the 
creation, proliferation and continuance of both destabilizing extremism and more precisely - 
terrorism - particularly that of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.  
Also, if it does not address the ideas that created al-Qaeda as well as the unstable 
environment that their corrupting influence exploits, will they not continue to be replaced by 
other terrorist organizations that continue to form and fill the gaps left by those eliminated?    
The US State Department began their Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list in 1997. 
Between then and September 10, 2001, they listed 24 groups (three of which were de-listed). 
Since 9/11, 33 more groups have been declared terrorist organizations. It is true that six have 
been de-listed, but of those, only two had ties to al-Qaeda. Furthermore in the case of the 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, while some of its assets and personnel were captured, their 
remaining members only joined another extremist group with stronger ties to al-Qaeda.
234
 As the 
ever-expanding FTO list shows, a new plan is needed to be successful both in combating terrorist 
groups, chiefly al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and in addressing the underlying conditions that 
permit them to prosper, one that will gain the support of American citizens and its allies.  
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Moreover, by including actions to continue achieving immediate goals, America can 
prevent a backslide in progress while waiting for its actions - long-run goals of marginalization 
and stabilization - to fully manifest. In transforming the US response, it will better able to bring 
about a future where state stability and prosperity are commonplace worldwide, and terrorist 
groups, in particular al-Qaeda and its affiliates are ineffectual, marginalized, insubstantial shells 
of their present selves, if they continue to persist at all. With all of this in mind, this paper will 
now first give an overview of state building followed by an examination of the military and 
civilian efforts to achieve said construction.  
State Building Overview 
America's state building experience goes back to the rebuilding post-World War II. The 
successes in Germany and Japan have not been matched. Granted the building efforts had 
options at their disposal that would not be feasible today. In the case of Germany most party 
members were pardoned, because they had technical skills needed to grow their economy and 
reduce their reliance on the Allied military. Allied forces also controlled the new, to manage 
perceptions of their actions, while suppressing history unfavorable to fixing the national identity. 
Although in the strictest sense what happened in the 1950s was primarily nation building and not 
state building, it showed what the United States and its allies could do if so inclined. 
Traditionally nation-building referred to reformation of a national identity while state building 
dealt with infrastructure and institution building for an underdeveloped state.  
Also, while the contingency planning process was military led during the implementation 
in Japan by General Douglas MacArthur, but his staff was a completely integrated civil-military 
group reporting to him through the Joint Chiefs of staff to improve both the planning and 
implementation. As Secretary Stimson noted “WWII demonstrated with unrepresented clarity the 
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close interconnection between military and civilian affairs.”5 Later on the divergent schools of 
thought further confused the issue of state building. One school, exemplified by the news media 
today, portrays it as foreign countries intervening. The other, primarily academia, referred to 
efforts undertaken by indigenous people.
6
  
More recently nation building has been used to describe "the use of armed force in the 
aftermath of conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy."
7
 However, to avoid 
confusion what will be herein referenced as state building, will refer to foreign intervention to 
aid the state in reducing social issues that lead to destabilizing extremism and in most cases will 
begin with military, intervention to stabilize and begin state building that will be expanded on by 
civilians.
8
 Move specifically it will be purposeful efforts by a foreign government, namely the 
United States, to construct institutions of the national government that can eventually take over 
and satisfy the needs of their people. These efforts will often be characterized by military 
occupation and transitional government assistance if needed, as well as long-term engagement 
involving large-scale investment. Also, it may use propaganda to gain support for actions and 
policies with people of both the foreign and host government.
9
 Historically the United States has 
been quite successful with nation building such as post-WWII, but not as successful in state 
building when the infrastructure for nation building does not exist as seen in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during and after the war.
10
  
The ultimate goal is to create self-sustaining sufficiently strong government, although the 
military is biased toward quick exits. Instead of fully implementing a state building strategy that 
will allow for a smooth withdrawal, while leaving institutions that can do everything needed to 
maintain and enrich the country. To achieve this, more integration in civilian efforts and the 
ability to compliment the military’s earlier efforts achieves longer lasting results. In the case of 
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Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld discussed a "lite" nation building strategy. The result was a rapid 
transition to Iraqi control in which it is up to them – excluding ex-Baathists - to bring about 
change. However, the result was perceived as illegitimate by many citizens, and is an 
administratively weak new government the Iraqi officials were ill equipped to confront an 
uncertain future. It seems to be a long way from the stability and construction products of 
America’s past, and more of an intellectual justification for tough-love.  
Two years after the US left Iraq, in 2013 alone, more than 8,000 people were killed, 
according to United Nations [UN] estimates. Furthermore, most of them were civilians. Also it 
was a result of the previously suppressed Shia majority commencing marginalization of the 
Sunni minority. Also with the Sunni ability to protest suppressed by the government, the al-
Qaeda affiliate Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was able to exploit the discontent and gain a 
foothold the US had fought for years to remove.
11
 Did the US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
over the last decade go as smoothly as they should have, given that they were preceded by five 
nation-building efforts, four in Muslim dominant nations, during the late 1980s and 1990s? 
There were even similar problems of collapsed central governance in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Haiti, and Afghanistan. However, in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, the foreign forces were 
able to address the security issues and return stability, unlike the other cases where instability 
still exists. As the RAND study points out, while the United States substantially improved its 
ability to fight insurgencies, there has not been a comparable improvement in either military or 
civilian agencies to "successfully conduct post combat stabilization and reconstruction 
operations."
12
   
During the Bush administration, the US supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan 
in its efforts to establish a non-Taliban government. While this was done to stabilize the 
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country's political landscape and gain the support of the various warlords to aid America's 
coalition campaign against Taliban fighters linked to al-Qaeda, it ignored the history of the post-
Soviet withdrawal period when civil war began ravaging the country. Also, although India saw 
the change as an opportunity to forge closer ties with Afghanistan, the move angered Pakistan, 
who favored the Taliban government leading to the Taliban insurgency swelling in size and 
strength. So after 2004 when the US was relying on "light footprint" strategy based on air raids, 
and the US choosing to support the less favored group, led to falling local support and less 
credibility, due to America in many ways propping up the non-Taliban central government.
13
    
While this not a prescription for allowing internal conflicts to play out without US 
intervention - such as that described by strategist and historian Edward Luttwak - so long as it 
does not undermine American’s interests, including maintaining and extending Afghanistan’s 
limited social progress in light of Islamist and tribal-centric conservative resistance. By tipping 
the balance of power in the country as the United States has, it distorted the underlying and 
enduring local realities of power, and therefore must be taken into consideration in future actions 
both in Afghanistan and other terrorist breeding grounds. As he stated in “Give War a Chance,” 
unlike NATO intervening on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians against their 
vastly more powerful adversary the Serbians during the 1990s Balkans war, countries like 
Afghanistan are not surrounded by permanent NATO forces and EU territory on all sides, 
meaning shifting governance like was done, created a precarious situation for the government 
being aided. Also unlike Europe the countries that surround states including Afghanistan are not 
necessarily committed to maintaining a peace they’ve helped create or the resulting power 
balance shift.  
 8 
If anything resulted in the case of Afghanistan while Western-led forces did tip the 
balance in favor of the non-Pashtun ethnicities and the less conservative Pashtun of the Northern 
Alliance, it has also further entrenched the conservative groups that fight on the side of the - 
Taliban more for familial and tribal honor than as true supporters of the insurgency - but no 
similar mass constituency exists for the sake of liberal reform, resulting in a stagnation of long-
lasting change.
14
  
President Obama attempted to address concerns and regain support of the Afghan people 
by reviewing the situation and forming a strategy emphasizing intolerance of a corrupt and 
ineffective government, but as current leadership is strong enough to currently retain control, the 
US is stuck with them for now. Also due to the Bush administration’s focus on addressing 
security concerns while failing to address more civilian state building issues, resulted in a lost 
opportunity to more fully transform Afghanistan into a more equal future partner in the desired 
stabilization of the region.  
Some programs employed were the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) program, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) actions, and the Disbandment of Illegal 
Armed Groups (DIAG) initiative as well as other improvements to the Afghan National Army 
and Afghan National Police. However, none of these addressed the sizable issues in the state’s 
governance in any of its three branches, instead substantive actions were at lower levels of 
government, stopping short of restoring institutional legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan 
people.
15
 Also, starting in 2005 and continuing through the end of his presidency, some 
temporary relief was provided through Provincial Reconstruction Teams - PRTs to the locals, 
even they did not address the underlying issues. In this vein the Afghan Compact (later modified 
through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy) that worked in conjunction to create 
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greater social engagement in an effort to improve local support in Afghanistan, with limited 
success. In doing this – effectively in conjunction with military efforts - a more balanced 
approach could form a sustainable equilibrium between military solutions and state building 
efforts.
16
  
Over the last few years, the Obama administration has called for the need to win their 
hearts and minds, but this realization may be coming too late. America and its allies do not seem 
to want or feel able to support the necessary engagement, but "the path to the exit door is likely 
to be protracted, tortuous, and bloody"; as a result.
17
 
Now it has been argued that long-term state building will not materialize in a meaningful 
fashion in the near future, due to the resource requirements and long-term commitment and 
current economic and political realities. However, if the United States can better connect its 
various foreign operations, both civilian and military, and utilize NGOs and international 
partners to improve governments plagued with, but incapable of excising terrorists, one can 
presume possible comprehensive state building. On the subject of long-term engagement, the 
United States will find it more difficult in some ways to gain support, but this is more a matter of 
proper planning to resolve the problems and proper framing of the discussion to predict resulting 
issues.  
By moving beyond simply fighting, can United States seek to end the endless series of 
crises, and confront the underlying pathologies that give rise to interstate violence and 
extremism?
18
 Presently US state building efforts remain in the doldrums, with America’s 
strategy continuously shifting from one action to the next. As a result, state building in any 
meaningful capacity is not currently occurring, and it is simply a slogan in press releases, 
disconnecting rhetoric and action. It is wise fully to integrate national efforts, and move beyond 
 10 
stopgap measures that are costly while providing ephemeral solutions, to offset single-state costs 
by increasing reliance on international partners. Also, it is fine to utilize various (international) 
INGOs' specialized knowledge in targeted piecemeal approaches.     
An Examination Of Military and Civilian State building   
In the wake of the turbulence throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East, resulting 
from the Arab Spring and its inability to survive expectations, coupled with foreign troop 
withdrawals and their country’s overall instability all parties have to re-evaluate their methods to 
improve their success rate. It is important for the US to finds new allies, as well as reengage and 
expand its role in counterterrorism operations to curb the continued spread of terrorism. 
However, if long-term goals are not taken into account, this may go against the United States’ 
interest in creating long-term partners to help in its global efforts to end the epoch of terrorist 
networks, due to the immediacy of its vision.  
Since 2001, when the Bush administration expanded and refocused United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) to provide greater aid in countries where terrorism 
persists through a refocusing of the State department to aid in what was called transformational 
diplomacy. Coined by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, this type of diplomacy was supposed 
to work with our allies to “build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to 
the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”19 
This can be done through regionally focused improvements, aimed at cooperative state 
building, complimenting, supporting, and expanding the military’s gains. However by linking 
civilian efforts, with those from the security domain overshadow the State department, its 
partners and by extension USAID’s traditional development efforts and turning it into a quasi-
security agency. So-called “transformational diplomacy” in countries like Kenya is only a return 
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to the Cold War policing assistance. While there is a place for such support, there is a difference 
between improving individual security from common crimes and helping those who are ready 
establish a system that can remove regional extremism. The Bush-era funding of the East Africa 
Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) impinges State’s institutional legitimacy and does not 
properly address this problem; it simply politicizes it into centering on short-term objectives.
20
  
The East African Regional Strategic initiative replaced, in 2009, the EACTI. This 
program extended the program across the horn of Africa, like other programs begun in the early 
2000s, for example, the State Department’s Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) in West Africa. However 
they were they are incorporated, like PSI into the Department of Defense (DOD) focused 
programs to support Operation Enduring Freedom. What results is an interagency effort to 
undermine current terrorist haven through particular development and diplomacy programs, 
instead of focusing on potential longer-term gains by focusing on human security.
21
 In its present 
incarnation, the perceived politicization of US development by some governments and INGOs 
has resulted in an increasing focus on short-term security interests at the expense of long-term 
development projects that are more US-centric.
22
  
Also, USAID for the remaining long-term initiatives in unstable countries may alienate or 
discriminate against people through its adoption of the Partner Vetting System, according to the 
ACLU in addition to privacy concerns, the system also creates due process issues, as it relies on 
the government’s secret intelligence databases.23 While this is done in an effort to stem the 
potential for terrorists to acquire assistance funds, and promote its legitimacy especially in 
terrorist infested countries, where such is not always an easy proposition due to other US past 
and ongoing actions.
24
 This exacerbates an already potentially significant problem in which other 
organizations that the US collaborates with such as the World Bank, the European Union (EU), 
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and Department for International Development (DFID) may be impacted negatively by 
suspicions of USAID resulting from the changed mandate of the State department, through 
which it has undertaken a coordination role for all government based civilian efforts through the 
five-year-old Civilian Response Corps (CRC), and through which the State department tries to 
harmonize civilian and military activities.
25
 
Regardless of al-Qaeda's exploitation of the turmoil surrounding the various protests 
since 2011, they are still representative of a small minority. While they have sought to shape 
their message and recruitment strategies to these events, the majority of their audience only seeks 
greater political freedom and economic opportunity. The majority does not seek an unending 
series of wars with westerners or infidels regardless of al-Qaeda proclamations. This shows a 
desire for the human security focused development that organizations including CRC are 
becoming known for. 
Various terrorist groups primarily al-Qaeda, fashion their rhetoric and actions so that 
each time these people castoff the yoke of their tyrant be it Hosni Mubarak or Muammar Qaddafi 
or their more recent successors, al-Qaeda and its ilk frame or attempt to frame events, in a way, 
that vilifies the west, in particular America, and America’s move toward its own immediate 
security even at the expense of these exploited peoples does the US no favors in the long-run. In 
essence, the terrorists try to hijack the revolutions, pointing to how America and its allies often 
worked with these failed regimes, providing them support. Instead of furthering opportunities for 
more sustainable and mutually beneficial progress, the United States and its partners perpetuate 
short-term patches to failed systems. Will increasing human security focused state building, as 
opposed to just strengthening state security, not benefit the US and its global partners to a greater 
degree in the long run?  
 13 
Instead of simply attaching America’s backing to whoever is in power at a given time, 
what if America where possible helped to bring greater political freedom and economic 
opportunities to the peoples of these war-ravaged countries through state building mechanisms? 
By understanding that to ally itself in any great fashion to the tumultuous regimes on this long 
but inevitable road to greater freedom and opportunities, simply creates fodder for al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates to exploit. Essentially, does America need to re-brand itself not as the controlling 
overseer dictating terms of other countries’ futures, but instead as a partner or guide that 
understands it has a substantial but secondary part to play in these countries futures?  
The present and continuing efforts in counterterrorism continue to align the US with 
failing or fallen regimes and undermine its long-term goals. In more free, prosperous and stable 
countries there will be fewer opportunities for al-Qaeda to exploit. It may not be as clear-cut as 
excising them, but it is necessary for both America and these peoples’ future security. To this 
end America should focus on building stronger, more stable governments. Also in these efforts, 
it seems as though the United States' singular concern is with Islamist parties. Is this because 
it fears extremist sympathizers undermining the democratic reforms and simply giving Islamic 
extremism more power; regardless of what al-Qaeda publicly declares not all of them are their 
allies. The past has shown the US that when a terrorist or insurgency group wants to retain 
political power - in a democracy - it has to move away from the extremes to increase their appeal 
with the voters.  
Examples of this phenomenon abound. When looking at the PLO (Palestine Liberation 
Organization) and its pledge to avoid violence and terrorism in exchange for United Nations 
(UN) recognition, Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA's (Irish Republican Army’s) demilitarized, 
and Hezbollah’s political recognition and pressure to end their violence; each group made some 
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concessions for a seat at the table so to speak. Inversely, when such groups do not compromise 
or fail to become more centrist, they suffer backlash from their supporters as in the case of Egypt 
after the Arab Spring.  
This is due to the aforementioned dissonant goals between these groups and those they 
have often come to represent, meaning they can change or go back to being associated with 
terrorism, insurgency, and other illegal largely condemned actions. For instance, the Muslim 
Brotherhood won nearly half the Parliamentary seats, and its candidate Morsi became Egypt’s 
first democratically elected president; however they failed to compromise on their extremist 
authoritarian position, and they lost the support of the Egyptian people, as well as creating a 
situation the conservative clerics and authoritarian military leaders we able to exploit.  
By focusing on undermining al-Qaeda’s and its affiliates’ ability to function and sustain 
themselves through the continual renewal of their power through sanctum and novitiates, 
America reduces terrorists’ hold on these regions through non-security based aid. To see this as a 
series of asymmetric military campaigns, even one with a political and ideological component is 
a failure to utilize all available tools to achieve America’s broader policy goals. To this end there 
are a number of strategies to employ for long-term improvement. Essential to this is increasing 
the United States’ humanitarian assistance and development aid, to reverse the worsening 
security conditions throughout the Maghreb that are essential to the cooperation and delivery 
mechanisms used in reforms, as well as for the promotion of state building initiatives. If the 
United States and its allies are to create sustained improvements throughout the Maghreb and 
also throughout the Middle East could they maximize these efforts effects if they are holistic and 
regionally specific as well as cross-program integrated?  
 15 
Although these potential alterations could do much to better prepare the US for present 
and future threats, would a specific effort to improve institutional strength, and sustainability 
solidify and improve these gains? Also by doing this, will America prevent holes and overlaps in 
the support structure, and also improve them so that the people in these regions have control over 
their own future? Through this, the United States creates self-sufficient future partners instead of 
weak, ineffectual possibly corrupt puppets. Furthermore guarding against a corruption of these 
states, aids in the prevention of exploitation by terrorist groups, either those that exist now or 
those that may exist in the future. This is particularly true in the case of the mistaken belief that 
simply expanding the amount of aid directly translates into “the ability of America to positively 
influence events abroad.”26 Take Pakistan and Egypt, countries that receive a great deal of aid 
are they anymore in tune with American values, and are such a thing necessary for protecting our 
interests?  
What if to accomplish this, the United States consults its allies to see what they may be 
doing that the US is not? Then from this, determinations can be made to augment best both in 
resources and scope their efforts to enhance local, regional and national peace and security, 
democratization and good governance, especially through improving law enforcement 
cooperation and judicial system improvements. King Abdulla of Saudi Arabia has responded by 
pledging greater protection of his country’s critical infrastructure.27 Also, he is addressing the 
underlying causes through education and judicial reforms as well as economic diversification. 
Yes, he has also enacted some legislation reminiscent of America’s own detention programs, and 
it is true that the specific efforts his government’s undertaken may not translate to less stable 
non-monarchies. However, some of his reforms, as mentioned, are beneficial to the 
marginalization of undesired destabilizing elements, providing useful information and a reminder 
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that there is not a universal approach to resolving this problem set. In seeing what its allies are 
doing, America can better assist these countries in humanitarian capacities as they will already 
be presumably focusing on security issues to gain their citizens support as in the case of Libya in 
regard to potential US and NATO-led training.
2829
 In regard to current USAID and CRC 
practices for fragile states (formulated for places where development and government have 
failed), it is useful to have the military increase dialogue with development experts to better 
compliment civilian development work, particularly in creating enough security and stability that 
organizations including the CRC and its partners will have more infrastructural support from 
which to build. This leaves the primary security operations with better-equipped entities such as 
the DOD.
30
 Also while there have been efforts to expand its new regional role as a conduit in 
civil-military partnerships, as shown in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams employed in 
Afghanistan, they have failed in their present form.
31
 To improve future efforts the US should 
work with its international partners to make the broken states’ leaders central to plans. 
Specifically they can do this through a focus on the peace building and state building goal, 
conceived under the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) guidance. Work 
with local leaders of target states to legitimize the political environment, through justice reforms, 
while improving government based services, economic opportunities for citizens, and overall 
state stability through comprehensive security improvements.
32
  
Also, while the current and proposed counterterrorism operations are largely beneficial, 
will they improve if placed in the framework of America’s overall goals? It is imperative to 
understand that such operations are not the central focus of many of these unstable countries 
beyond the understanding that making it a priority means potentially more military aid both 
financially and militarily. This financial assistance may be beneficial in retaining their power, 
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but it could also potentially undermine what credibility America retains in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa.
33
 Consequentially some countries that the United States have an interest in do 
not have the necessary state structures or political consensus to make these drastic changes 
feasible, as their countries presently exist. In these cases, the US needs to re-examine current 
efforts and work with NGOs and INGOs. By augmenting them with states’ resources through 
USAID and its foreign and international equivalents, it can improve economic opportunities and 
freedom before endeavoring to implement state building mechanisms for systematic reforms at 
all levels of governance.  
Closing Aid Gaps Through [I]NGOs 
At the end of September, Secretary of State John Kerry and Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu announced the commencement of a $200 million "Global Fund for 
Community Engagement and Resilience." The aim of the fund is to give grants to organizations 
trying to counter violent extremism. It will reach its initial funding goal through an initial 
contribution of approximately $2.5million from the United States, with the rest coming from 
primarily from the 29 members plus the EU comprising the newly formed Global 
Counterterrorism Forum. This will be augmented by some private companies so that a decade 
from now it can reach the funding goal.
34
 This program is illustrative of the support the United 
States should cultivate in the area of countering violent extremism.  
One problem existing in this area has been its lack of a clear definition of extremism and 
under-financing of counter-extremist organizations. Often the best practices are highly 
individualistic as are the specific catalysts they seek to address. Also, while funding these 
initiatives are narrower in scope than large nations are used to, the seemingly minor things they 
hope to achieve quite important as they provide the often necessary piecemeal approach needed 
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at the local level. Furthermore, these programs are often America’s best possible investment in 
countries that are difficult to work with due to perceived terrorist connections or inability to 
presently be feasible partners in a more comprehensive and news making fashion. American 
support of these types of initiatives is essential to curbing terrorist recruitment, and the 
persistence of terrorist safe havens.  
Furthermore, there is the understanding that local under supported NGOs have an often-
vital comprehension of the intricacies of their specific problem and how to address it. Can 
America bear this financial and logistical burden alone in coming years? America is currently the 
primary financier with all allies benefiting for far lesser contribution. It is crucial to its success 
that the US understand this if it is to increase reliance on such initiatives in the future as America 
gains more international support due to changes in other areas types of overseas operations. 
Furthermore, this is a promising start, but it does not presently have the needed financial and 
logistical support necessary for integration into more long-term state building plans for the 
countries that the US determines need such assistance. 
Also, although this Fund, created – in part – by the State Department, seeks to be 
inclusive of stakeholders at all levels in its governance and increase the chances of approval for 
small, but important proposals, it is not without its problems. From receiving funding and being 
implemented, will its inclusion of the host country in decision-making make it potentially more 
politically risk-averse toward smaller NGOs? As a result, this creates a potential vacuum in aid 
to countries that infected with widespread corruption or party to individuals complicit in terrorist 
actions, where it would help fill the gap in nation-based aid. This is because the 2010 US 
Supreme Court decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project et. Al., altered the prohibition of 
material support to terrorism legislation introduced in 1994 that was expanded first through the 
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USA PATRIOT Act, which means NGOs could be breaking US laws by providing much needed 
support.   
When the Act was first enacted it had a material support exclusion for humanitarian 
assistance for people who were not directly involved in terrorism, meaning among others, 
associates of current terrorists or people who had not broken laws, but had expressed interest in 
perhaps becoming an acolyte. After the Oklahoma City bombing, this provision was narrowed to 
medical and religious materials. What has been left, as a result, is an obfuscated understanding of 
whether current humanitarian assistance falls within the prosecutorial scope of the material 
support statute. Moreover, if the material support involves a FTO then the provision that such 
support, which otherwise exists when not involving FTO, is given with the knowledge or 
understanding that they are aiding in the execution of a terrorist act does not exist in such a case. 
They are deemed culpable if associating with someone or something that engages in terrorist 
activities regardless of humanitarian intent. What if through more clearly defining what may be 
prosecuted under the material support statutes INGOs could be sure in their undertakings, and 
what if the United States went further and reconsidered the previous exclusions for certain 
humanitarian assistance that were discontinued?  
In addition, while the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, declared certain 
automatic exceptions during a declared state of emergency for "donations ... of articles, such as 
food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering,"
35
 in the wake of 
September 2001, Executive Order 13224 overrode the humanitarian exemptions on grounds that 
allowing such donations would not only impair the President's ability successfully to deal with 
the declared an emergency, but could potentially endanger American forces in the regions where 
they were operating.
36
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If America’s goal is to deny terrorists, their networks, their associates, and possible future 
or unintentional associates any quarter then this is the correct strategy. However, what if 
America’s goal should be not purely to cut off any conceivable resources, but to create a 
doctrine, policy and practices that take into account the knowledge that potential short-term and 
long-term benefits to NGOs and those that benefit from their efforts outstrip any possible 
terrorist gains. Furthermore, NGOs provide services and alternatives to current and potential 
terrorists to dissuade them from their current or potential actions. Much like gangs or guerillas in 
other parts of the world, to see long-term sustainable revamping does not the United States need 
to increase the opportunities for the peoples in these countries? More precisely the impoverished, 
disadvantaged communities, by first promoting the work of NGOs and then with longer lasting 
more systemic change through improvements to these countries’ governments, when Nation 
based efforts and economically and politically feasible.  
Furthermore, in regard to the limitations imposed by the above statutes and others 
enforced by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in some 
cases there may be a need to provide some incidental transaction with local groups that may have 
ties to terrorist organizations due to how pervasive they may be. The aim being not to provide 
material support, but to be subject to protection rackets in order to safely conduct their work until 
the necessary state mechanisms are in place and equipped to deal with these problems.  
If this were unacceptable, then what if to still achieve the long-term goal the US provided 
such groups in the short term with some protection while they work to improve these areas to 
such an extent that their efforts are not putting them and those they help in danger? This could be 
done either through America’s or conceivably their country’s military or through private 
contractors until they are capable fending for themselves. However, to what degree is terrorist 
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association in any tenuous capacity unacceptable to the US? In many of these tribal societies 
there may be a few remote members with terrorist affiliations, but the rest are blameless, so who 
is barred from help from the US. For instance, in the fall of 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton appealed to the terrorist group al-Shabaab to allow food aid into famine-stricken parts of 
Somalia under its control. While did not acquiesce, more recently they have largely for 
propaganda purposes as there are many people starving, however were US aid workers to do so 
they could still theoretically risk legal action due to al-Shabaab's terrorist classification.
37
 There 
was some immunity outlaid for some NGOs, by the OFAC, which is responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of sanctions. However, their aegis against the current anti-
terrorism laws, only apply to those NGOs entirely financed by US government grants. Also, 
while US government officials including the USAID administrator has stated NGOs can operate 
without a license from OFAC in Somalia, this does not guarantee immunity from potential 
Justice Department prosecution, not through actual policy as that would be politically untenable, 
but by not making it a priority.
3839
 NGOs have also requested that USAID modify existing 
rewards to include non-US-funded activities. However, this has not occurred. 
There were some NGOs that paid for access to be able to operate in Somalia in 2011-
2012 during the famine, but acquiesced to their conditions to prevent being banned by al-
Shabaab. Unlike the World Food Program and the UN Children's Fund who were barred over 
perceived western spy infiltration, some permitted NGOs paid "registration and protection fees" 
as well as hiring al-Shabaab crew to monitor their work, allowing passage.
40
 In response to al-
Shabaab’s restrictions on western aid organizations and agencies, as well US potential 
prosecution under anti-terrorism statutes, other groups filled the aid gap in particular al-Qaeda, 
which is attempting to win over Somalis’ hearts and minds.41   
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For these state building endeavors to be multilaterally successful, it is important for 
international cooperation at all levels. Moreover, through better integration with and sourcing for 
nonmilitary efforts- both local education programs and improvements to their access of new 
situational and economic opportunities, America will be able to address human security issues, 
which underscore terrorism persistence. The problem with aid and more comprehensive state 
building is the seemingly greater complexity and sustained duration, compared to public 
discourse on military efforts. That is not to say that the legal or institutional intricacies and 
institutional hurdles are not present in military combat. However, it is more easy build support in 
the halls of government and the support of the people in issues involving direct actions with 
immediate dividends. Say, for example, that the United States government wants to kill some 
terrorists, or restructure current DOD bureaucracy to more facilely address the threat at hand, it 
also wants to simultaneously, in varied government agencies and their alien and non-government 
partners, better countries’ governance to reduce future threats. Which does one suppose is more 
rectifiable?  
This author believes both are achievable and essential to approaching US and 
international security. Gone are days when military officers needed only be masters of military 
things, and civilians bridged the gaps in cultural, linguistic, political, and institutional awareness. 
Today they are both taxed with political knowhow and the toll of increasing expansive public 
relations necessities, and the knowledge that improper solutions only delay the return of 
problems, years or decades hence.   
Furthermore, both groups — in both government and non-government capacities — find 
themselves sharing the weight of John Locke’s famous dictum that governments exist to 
safeguard, as best they can, life, liberty, and property.
42
 However by fully utilizing each group 
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and subgroups’ strengths they can share the increasing burden of state building, and accomplish 
far more than would have been possible by themselves.  
Also by doing this, keeps the local leadership as central to both the decision-making and 
execution process aids in its potential to succeed. Currently, a case could be made that the US 
and its allies are working in a manner that exhausts its resources and provides grounds for 
terrorist recruitment to flourish, but through a concerted effort by the US to stabilize the country 
enough to build and the using both our own knowledge base and that of local leadership this can 
change. Instead of overreaching and allowing terrorist exploitation of fragile situations as 
detailed in al-Qaeda theoretician Abu Bakr Naji ‘s (real identity unknown) 2004 book, The 
Management of Savagery, and from which al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri urged al-Qaeda 
leaders such as al-Qaeda in Iraq’s Abu Musab Zarqawi to do in 2005, by ending his sectarian war 
and broadening his base through any means that were Islamically acceptable. Of course, Narqawi 
and his followers failed to heed Zawahiri’s advice based on Naji’s blueprint, failing in their own 
limited state building efforts, but it shows that there is a concerted effort on the part of terrorists 
— however unsuccessful — to try and exploit situations where US state building efforts are 
failing.
43
 Also as their efforts in southern Yemen and Somalia show there is by and large an 
Islamist rejection throughout the region of al-Qaeda’s Islamic state model, which means there are 
local partners out there for the US and its allies to find and to assist instead of lead where 
possible, presently there are no examples in which international assistance for state building has 
been successful, instead when a foreign donor takes the lead as in the case of Afghanistan, for 
instance, the “aid overwhelm[s] and marginalize[s] the Afghan state, thus undermining the very 
state building process it supposedly is designed to promote.”44 Perhaps it was the faulty belief 
that a failing state, as seen by US policy makers at the time, was the entire reason for terrorism 
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and could be cultivated out of existence, however by seeing a weakened states as simply more 
subject to destabilizing elements that are no-longer territorially-bounded, it becomes preferable 
to have useful partners in these governments that the US and its allies are seeking to build up. 
Therefore, these interventions cannot be in any capacity thinly veiled projections of America or 
more broadly western ideology, as it may not work in every case, meaning reliance on local 
leaders for insight and direction through which to provide support is paramount.
45
 
Also, in order to succeed in any state building endeavor, it is important to consider non-
state armed actors, not terrorists, but local insurgencies that may be associating with terrorists 
simply to get more prestige or help. In these cases finding ways to limit their political and or 
economic maneuverability, while perhaps helping to push them toward one of three outcomes. 
Disarmament and eventually disbandment, transformation into a political force that can be 
integrated into the official state structure, or criminal element that can be dealt with by local law 
enforcement; once the likely or desired outcome is determined the US and its allies can help the 
state take the lead in bringing about the outcome and, as a result, also show their ability, to their 
people, of being able to effectively govern.
46
  
Now that both the military and civilian aspects of combatting al-Qaeda and like-minded 
groups through state building have been examined, why is it important that these be addressed 
and what is the interplay between what the United States says and what it does? 
The barbaric practice of terrorism – deliberately threatening or harming noncombatants to 
achieve political, ideological, or material gain – must be abolished through the concerted 
efforts of all peaceful nations. This will inevitably be an enduring endeavor that focuses 
on more than defeating existing terrorist organizations; it also will aim to deter future acts 
of terrorism and to diminish the underlying causes that enable terrorism to flourish. 
Though acts of terror can never be wholly prevented, terrorism must be reduced to a level 
that is isolated, rare and clearly irrational; that is, useless as a tool of practical policy or 
politics. This will ultimately allow terrorism to be combated as a criminal activity within 
single states, not as a global war.
47
    
 
 25 
Rhetoric Versus Actions     
While terrorist networks do not need mass support to allow for their continued existence, 
the discussed dialog can have a powerful impact on their operations, but this result is more 
profound when sustaining the dialog through performance. Al-Qaeda remains an imminent 
threat, so to marginalize their existence and cause their ultimate end, by collapsing al-Qaeda’s 
networks the United States will have to severely — with the unified effort of all our global 
partners — restrict their interstate coordinating capabilities. In doing this these afflicted countries 
in the process of rebuilding and improving will be more capable of dealing with attempted 
resurgence as an internal issue, once those more capable, including America help reduce al-
Qaeda and its affiliates’ remaining transnational capabilities if the afflicted such as Afghanistan 
are unable to currently to do so by themselves.  
However, America does not want to become Sisyphus with a self-perpetuating problem. 
Therefore, this will only work if it promotes practices that give state security and economic 
prosperity to African and Middle Eastern people, in a way that promotes American interests in 
all timeframes so that country-specific efforts are underway to alleviate our policing burden. To 
this end, beginning five years ago, the United States has begun to change its public and private 
rhetoric from the War on Terror (WOT) to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).  
This change in name while coinciding with a stronger emphasis on the legal basis not just 
moral imperative has not drastically changed the operational and organizational system to align 
with the re-branding.
48
 As actions do not transform to reflect the change in rhetoric, and support 
for US actions will not be reinvigorated. If, however, OCO came to focus on longer-term 
stability and marginalization efforts, the US may regain the trust and help of its allies in both 
promoting and carrying out the various military campaigns that will arise on this path to 
 26 
promoting the US interests overseas. Through proper context both policy makers and the broader 
public are less likely to have fear-based responses that undermine the slow, but sustained global 
improvements. 
 During the first few years after 9/11 the Bush administration constructed a deeply 
resonating narrative of terrorism as an existential threat to the US that must be confronted with 
perhaps an unending conflict, in which the ends wholly justify the means.
49
 This narrative was 
normalized through hegemonic discourse that focused on war, in particular, combating terrorism 
as a persistent part of US policy, and impacting American culture, and Americans' lives for many 
years, perhaps decades, to come.
50
 With the pervasive institutionalization of the WOT ideology 
under Bush’s tenure, any substantive changes, for instance, those during the Obama presidency 
are difficult to achieve, due to their basis in Bush-era changes and likely institutional 
intransigence. However, if the United States is to have substantiated perennial success, it 
becomes necessary to not signal an illusion of change where OCO is not substantively different 
besides its renaming. Furthermore, with its continuation and expansion of WOT actions, was the 
aforementioned change simply over optics? Should the reframing convey to everyone that a non-
warfare based doctrine, in which war plays only a partial role, should replace the military-centric 
WOT? In this regard, the military is placed within a comprehensive framework promoting 
positive, viable and sustainable growth, and evolution of society and politics in terrorism ravaged 
states, instead of perpetuating a war and policing efforts ad infinitum without an exit plan from 
the entire state of OCO.     
Would doing this decrease prevalence of the shorter-term WOT actions, and replace them 
with those that better reflect OCO, to align with a more comprehensive and better-suited 
viewpoint? This development has begun with the move announced in the new DOD budget on 
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April 6, 2009, in which it began moving away from conventional warfare and towards 
counterinsurgency, in particular low-intensity conflicts.
51
 This is a promising start, however, if a 
new doctrine is created, will it more easily allow the United States to see these military conflicts 
in broader terms and enact even broader changes?  
Should these oversees missions been seen as anything that marginalizes extremist 
behavior, including shorter term destruction of terrorist capabilities as well as more long-term 
actions focused entirely on removal of recurrent causes? Through a multifaceted multi-temporal 
approach, the United States can augment its capabilities and the resulting successes and become 
a better facilitator and partner in promoting a better future for its citizens and those of its allies 
around the world.  
However, in order for US actions in combating the persistence of groups such as al-
Qaeda, and eliminating the causes of violent radicalization, should perception, and practice 
become slightly obfuscated mirrors of each other? In this way, action could reflect talk and vice 
versa, but if needed, one could potentially act or speak, in a way, that is covered with the other. 
In other words, they reflect each other often enough that even when they are unable to do so, 
there is enough respect for American integrity that this lack is not noticeably deleterious to future 
interests.  
American leaders are obliged to reformulate present actions to reflect a more pragmatic 
palaver, but there is a need to recognize that in order for this transformation to occur and be 
sustained, support from its allies is vital. In particular, if America is to produce a multi-decade 
process towards stability and decreased radicalization, which threatens trans-state stability and 
resulting prosperity, it will need both continual vocal support for its actions, as well as increased 
financial supports.  
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Furthermore, as the need for military action, will hopefully lessen over time through 
OCO, it will become more important to rely on the strategies and services of NGOs to aid these 
victimized countries and their people. While the eventual goal can be a reduced need for 
asymmetric military operations and an increase in both military and civilian state building 
efforts, this will be precipitated by the removal of imminent al-Qaeda threats while increasing 
efforts to remove the underlying catalysts. In this fashion existing instability and prevalence of 
destabilizing, violent networks will necessitate continuance of military intervention in its 
traditional capacity but stabilization efforts will decrease this need if done properly. If the US 
changes the state of play in all the aforementioned areas will it be more successful than it has 
been thus far?  
Can the United States, through changes in the military and civilian spheres enact state 
building that endures, as well as unify where possible perception and reality, and move the world 
beyond the era of transnational terrorist groups in particular al-Qaeda and its affiliates? To be 
successful it will be necessary to reform the way the military currently operates better to provide 
for this dual role of going after immediate threats, terrorist or otherwise, while also setting the 
stage both socially and physically for civilians both governmental and non-governmental to enact 
the lion’s share of state building.  
Can America be expected to successfully combat both non-state actors and unstable or 
hostile governments in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape if it does not fully adapt? 
The fog of war is becoming more prevalent as numerous groups often with unclear motivations 
proliferate, and the United States’ focus shifts to confront these emerging threats. Also in this 
shift if America continues to adapt to increasingly fluid smaller scale threats, it must take care 
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that it does not lose its traditional Cold War inter-state capabilities should a future need to wage 
direct large-scale or when proxy wars arise.  
Military Structure      
Beginning in the 20
th
 century US policy makers, seeing a nation increasingly threatened 
by wars and state instability in a “shrinking” world, stopped trying to keep the outside world 
from shaping America and instead began efforts to reshape the world. These efforts began a long 
series of dramatic shifts over the past decades to confront the mounting challenges. Particularly 
since the end of World War II, the United States Armed Forces have undergone a number of 
major changes to confront increasingly complex threats. Beginning in 1949, the idea of total war 
with the Soviet Union meant the horrifying potential for global nuclear confrontation. So, 
beginning in the 1950s and through the Kennedy Presidency of the 1960s, the growing spread of 
communism created a dominant belief that greater flexibility within military doctrine was 
needed. What resulted was the Limited War school of thought that put forth a more nuanced use 
of military force that would fight proxy wars as exemplified in Vietnam. This strategy could both 
confront a complex threat and re-shape the world to fight the spread of Communism, without 
resorting to direct combat that might escalate into a nuclear exchange.
5253
 
When in Vietnam the US military used precise calculations in the application of limited 
force fighting the Viet Cong under unified civilian control. With the Viet Cong fighting a total 
war against America, the US military doctrine backfired because it relied on the presumed 
nominal sovereignty of Vietnam, which led to its downfall as the prevailing doctrine towards the 
end of the war. In the light of the perceived failures, military reformers have sought to reinstate a 
military-centered strategy in which the military regained its role in dictating military stratagem. 
In essence while there was an attempted integration of civilian and military groups, through the 
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Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support, its implementation was too little too late; 
and as a result while the US continued to operate under the fiction of sovereignty and thus gave 
the lead to the State department, it was a false premise that Vietnam continued to be sovereign 
and not just self-governed after 1956. The civilian leaders argued that the idea of Limited War 
where militaries would be used to signal for diplomatic efforts instead of fight using our full 
strength had caused needless losses that did not contribute to the US’s Vietnam goals. 
Specifically the attempts at coercive diplomacy by the Johnson administration, through an open-
ended war commitment based on intimidating the North Vietnamese leadership out of a full scale 
war and toward negotiating was based on the flawed assumption that intimidating the enemy 
leaders would end their war goals and bring them to the negotiation table. Beginning with the 
March 1965 bombing campaign, the US signaled for a diplomatic resolution but they misread 
either their own ability to project power or the North Vietnamese’s commitment, leading to the 
military’s push towards regaining primary control over tactical and strategic decisions.  
By the 1980s primacy of military engagements and decisive victory had returned to US 
military doctrine, yet the failed 1980 hostage rescue and the 1983 barracks bombing in Beirut 
heralded the doctrine of Overwhelming Force. This has also been known as the Weinberger 
doctrine and in some capacity as the Powell doctrine. Central to this doctrine is clear objectives, 
the means to achieve them, and general support. It also returned military victories to the 
centerpiece of a strategy focused on operational concerns dominated by military and like-minded 
civilian leaders. A central characteristic of this doctrine was the military only fighting when 
success is assured, and reason for fighting was worthwhile.
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 The problem with the perspective 
was its rigidity over the numerous military deaths from anterior doctrines. Success, however, in 
both Panama and later in the Persian Gulf, gave it staying power.  
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The decline of the Soviet Union and the change of the international landscape coinciding 
with the start of President Clinton's first term began the era of Precision Strikes, which lasted 
until September 11, 2001. The change came about due to the 18 American soldiers killed hunting 
Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid during the Battle of Mogadishu. The rise of cruise 
missiles and air strikes were shown in smaller scale operations like the bombing of al-Qaeda 
camps in Afghanistan and larger scale bombings in Kosovo. The focus on precision-strikes was 
meant to be seen as low-risk and shape diplomacy, but also reinforced the belief that America 
was no longer willing to sustain casualties. This was demonstrated in the law enforcement 
approach to combatting terrorism, but also emboldened the terrorists who were operating under 
the same conclusion, of America’s distaste for direct, large-scale and or sustained intervention.56 
However, unlike President Clinton, President Bush favored overwhelming direct 
engagements, and so he adopted the Decisive Action doctrine that returned focus to direct 
combat operations. This change also recognized past successes under prior doctrines and sought 
to form more suited force structure, personnel system, and strategy so as to utilize technology. In 
a way, this increased the America's decisive lethality in combat operations and removal of the 
need for large logistical and defense apparatus on frontlines. In this way, for example, the 
technology of the Clinton era was combined with the Overwhelming Force of the 1980s, and the 
limited political goals of the Vietnam War; all in an effort to create something greater than the 
more limited combined successes of the past doctrines.
57
 However, the use of COIN 
(counterinsurgency) tactics to achieve these doctrinal goals has shown military strategists that to 
effectively confront conventional and unconventional foes in an era of both mass anti-terrorism 
efforts as well as the potential for more traditional battles, the tools we use to achieve military 
goals while accounting for broader strategy and policy considerations the approach needs to be 
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both adaptive and comprehensive. Counterinsurgency is the most basic sense is the actions taken 
by the incumbent government to quell or contain an insurgency taken against its nation, but more 
broadly it is one of the main tools at the military’s disposal to stabilize and strengthen 
governments while denying sanctuary to al-Qaeda or those that aid it or its affiliates.
58
 As the US 
continues its shift toward a broader spectrum of conflict, outlined in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review, will it have to reform the tools that it utilizes as well as the system meant to use 
them to confront our plethora of present and future challenges?     
With the November 2013, release of Joint Publication 3-24 and upcoming publication of 
the new COIN field manual (FM 3-24), the debate over institutionalizing lessons learned since 
reigniting America's combat operations that began in the early 2000s. However two problems 
arise and detrimentally impact overall US national security strategy. While the publication shows 
advancement in US conceptualization of problems and solutions from their initial formation in 
2001, the DOD continues to see COIN as a strategy, even conflating it with strategy and policy 
as opposed to the reality that it is only one of many tools to achieve larger goals.
5960
 "COIN is 
neither a concept nor can it be a strategy. Instead, it is merely an acronymic descriptor of a 
basket of diverse activities intended to counterinsurgency.”61  
Also, while using COIN is inescapable as it is currently the best tool for reducing 
existential threats to long-term building endeavors, it is less effective because of its use in a 
traditional large, cumbersome military structure that has been shown to over estimate its own 
infallibility. Although COIN seeks to address the issues seen in previous wars of highly 
advanced large forces trying to fight smaller more mobile forces, its current structure disallows 
the full strength of its force from being brought to bear. Immaterial is whether it is against al-
Qaeda and its affiliates or their supporters including the Taliban. One of the debates central to a 
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discussion on the effectiveness and focus of COIN is over what it should focus on in conjunction 
with previously discussed military transformation it is useful to conclude the following debate to 
resolve COIN so that it will fully aid in the military’s part of state stabilization required for a 
successful state building that follows. Although FM 3-24 is an amalgamation of best practices 
based on past engagements, would not the integration of a foundational theory such as 
Clausewitz's On War provide much-needed context? Presently the FM 3-24, while displaying an 
array of tactics covering manifold operational foci, confuses their application by placing it within 
a population-centric viewpoint.
62
  
 In the past, going back to the late 19th century, it was believed that there was no center of 
gravity in irregular warfare. Practitioners including Joseph Gallieni and French Marshall Louise 
Lyautey, whose work was encapsulated in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 
took lessons learned by French forces in places like Vietnam, Morocco, and Algeria to form the 
"population-centric" school of counterinsurgency. They believed that the center of gravity in 
asymmetric conflicts is the civilian population, and that if that is who got their help they would 
be compensated with loyalty and defeat the insurgent threat. More recently this conception 
dominates FM 3-24 used by the US Army and Marine Corps.
63
 The competing theory presumes 
population-centric COIN is folly, and the sole focus should be pursuit and destruction of 
insurgents. In this camp are a number of military theorists: American Col. Gian Gentile and Col. 
Ralph Peters, British civilian theorist William F. Owen and Israeli academic Martin Van 
Crevald. The underlying premise of both is a presumption of static center of gravity with their 
COIN focus and an arbitrary connection to the non-center factors.  
Still, as Clausewitz long ago theorized in On War, any conflict is subject to three 
competing forces. While his ideas are rather abstract, he provided examples; essentially they are, 
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the populace will be violent and hateful, the military characterized by probabilities and chance, 
and governing organizations responsible for policy but subject to the irrationality of war. As he 
articulated in his treatise, "A theory which would leave any one of them out of account, or set up 
any arbitrary relation between them, may immediately become involved in such a contradiction 
with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone.”64    
 Both major schools of thought presume that the center of gravity is one of the trinity, but 
Clausewitz never states that. While he provided some examples he described the center as the 
thing that everything depends on, the hub of all movement and power.
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 While the initial focus 
was on enemy-centric COIN as seen in Afghanistan, by 2006 and the progressive focus on Iraq 
led to a polar shift toward population-centric COIN.  
 Presently Clausewitz's work is not being properly utilized, instead in an overly narrow 
and simplistic application in which the US focuses primarily on population-centric or enemy-
centric instead of giving equal weight to both. By targeting few or often disproportionately one 
dimension of the conflict, which undermines America’s application of the optimal COIN tactics 
within the Decisive Action doctrine, and jeopardizes state building interests.
66
 In fact, recently 
Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said, "nation building is not our 
strategic goal.”67 Also in 2008, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen 
declared in 2008, troop focus was to "hunt the Taliban and al-Qaeda," not to abet the Afghani 
population or enact state building efforts, believing the military successes were enough.
68
 In any 
event as detailed by former Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry, when the Western forces 
focused on the civilian population, particularly during and after the surge, the desired COIN state 
building actions were interpreted to mean anything and everything; as a result there was nothing 
substantial enough to build on for the inadequate number of civilian specialists that followed. 
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Instead of a detailed data driven, politically bounded long-term plan, what resulted was, as Karl 
Eikenberry called it, a disjointed highly flawed plan subject to every new COIN toss.
69
   
Transforming the US Military Structure 
Regardless, in order to fully address this, it is beneficial to update the military’s 
operational and organizational structures, to aid in the integration with civilian actions. By 
restructuring the military to move beyond the present limitations resulting from the population-
centric COIN strategy being utilized by multiple branches of the US military, the US may apply 
a far more nuanced and complex approach, which could collectively affect a far greater 
difference than any constituent aspect. 
In the latter part of 2006, it became necessary to change the way the US conducted war to 
address the shift in the types of enemies and threats being faced. As a result, certain US generals 
implemented the current COIN strategy.
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 While COIN did a number of important things 
including making civilians and noncombatants the focus, in its current incarnation it is being 
viewed as a strategy instead of a tool or mission created to achieve an aspect of the United States' 
strategic goals. Also, it created a false dichotomy of civilian-centric COIN versus combatant-
focused COIN, as will be discussed certain restructuring will bypass this conundrum allowing for 
use of all available tools to achieve overall goals.
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Indicative of the current approach is the central massive, long-lasting elephantine military 
presence in whatever country deemed to be problematic. Instead, to be effective, would it not be 
better for America to see the overall design in the country or region - destabilized by extremists 
such as al-Qaeda - as one of marginalizing the threat first through smaller more rapid 
overwhelming force at pivotal targets? Through this strategic use of troops and civilian 
contractors could be used to stabilize and rebuild. However, this large core should not preclude 
 36 
small-scale individualized efforts instead if the situation calls for it. In some instances, will it not 
be more effective and efficient to send in smaller, more mobile units to quell the radicalization 
instead of a full-scale force?  
For example, to combat the immediate rise of possible future al-Qaeda affiliates the US 
could send in small highly mobile ground teams to stem the rise, while security and 
strengthening the central authority, possible local militaries, police, government as opposed to 
leading or working alone. Then to bring in non-state actors such as local NGOs to be supported 
by the UN and the USAID during which the military will withdraw personnel. If necessary could 
the US, or another international partner contract some private security personnel to protect these 
aid workers and the populations they are working to improve, if the area is still unstable but not 
enough to warrant a traditional military contingent. The author believes this to be the case 
because it could change the prevailing mindset in state building from long-term military-centric 
occupations to a civilian-centric but military augmented operations, without unduly endangering 
US lives – civilian or military, government or non-government. However, before discussing 
contractors and the merging of military and civilian roles in state building, does the military need 
to be radically transformed to help in its changing dual mission of warfare and specifically COIN 
tactics in the context of state transformations? 
If the United States is to move beyond a military-centric approach to one in which the 
military is part of a more comprehensive strategy, both during and post-conflict will it have 
redress the current organizational and leadership mechanisms? At present there is a potential 
inability for the United States to update these mechanisms, which may inhibit the military’s 
ability to fulfill its changing role. Over the last two decades, there have been a handful of 
transformative pieces on how to best structure the military to confront the problem of 
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counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare all in the context of long run state stability and 
interstate relations. To fulfill this task three pieces on military responses to emerging threats will 
be examined to explain the optimal restructuring of the United States military to better handle 
present and future conflicts.  
While this author will not espouse all of their proposals or their underlying presumptions, 
as they are quite expansive, more so than necessary for this paper. Furthermore in regard to the 
second piece on the delineation of divergent responsibilities, this author is replacing the espoused 
reason for the change from disconnectedness to extremist ideology and terrorist network 
proliferation, but does not believe the change undermining the transformation of the force 
structure. This author has also concluded based on the below evidence that the following 
arguments by Col. (Ret) Douglas Macgregor and geostrategic Thomas P.M. Barnett together 
present a viable solution to an age-old problem. This problem is fighting the next war with the 
tactics and strategies of the last war or going too far to overcome prior failings recreating old 
weaknesses.  
In the late 1990s, Douglas Macgregor penned, Breaking the Phalanx, in which he 
advocated greater horizontal integration within the military branches to make them more 
effective and more able to quickly deploy for Joint operations. Should America preempt 
operational failures and large-scale defeat instead of being reactive to reordering the military? 
Simply taking the current structure and adding more technology or weaponry is neither the best 
use of resources nor the most effective; instead he advises that keeping pace with technological 
advancements, but not forcing the use of said technology, in a way, that undermines its purpose. 
What if the military were restructured to allow for greater ability to bring medium-to-large forces 
to bear more rapidly as opposed to massive forces at a slower pace? Important to note is that 
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while America military has not learned from his lessons, others including the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army have.  
According to a 2011 study by the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute, the "PLA is 
redesigning its forces into battle groups, using modular force structures and logistics to support 
operations in high altitude and complex terrains, conduct out of area operations, and develop the 
core for its vision of a hardened and network centric army."
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 The United States in increasingly 
involved in frequent lower-intensity asymmetric warfare and state building as opposed to 
traditional state-on-state conflict. Since this is the case is it wise to follow suit and reform 
military structure to confront this wide array of possible situations, but do so, in a way that 
retains traditional capabilities in the event they are needed is not a simple task. Perhaps, to this 
end, the military should incorporate the ideas of the Macgregor Transformation Model, but is 
that enough?  
While Macgregor’s ideas will do much, to fully address the multitude of roles that the US 
military has been trying to fulfill, what if, to prevent state building from potentially undermining 
strictly military capacities it could restructure itself to a far greater degree. However, can this be 
done without sacrificing any of these needed capabilities, and in a way that promotes its ability 
to conduct both war and peace operations with equal success? In the wake of the US-led 
invasions of the Middle East in the early 2000s, Thomas P.M. Barnett presented the idea of 
restructuring the United States military into a force which recognizes these dual roles and which 
addresses them in the most efficient, responsible and sustainable manner possible. The two 
groups that will comprise the US military are the “Leviathan” and the “System Administrator.” 
The Leviathan will act as a traditional military where overwhelming force is used to bring a swift 
end to the conflict using young, energetic forces, being sure to utilize Macgregor’s 
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aforementioned changes. While the System Administrator will focus on nation building and 
peacekeeping operations, and will be comprised primarily of current more seasoned veterans 
thus extending soldiers’ careers, and be replenished when soldiers reach a certain age or 
experience level in the Leviathan.  
In this regard, the military will provide basic infrastructure and initial support and security 
for when their civilian counterparts come to aid in state building. Barrett argues that there should 
be one exception to this delineation in that the Administrator’s staffing could include the US 
Marines, which Macgregor recommends downsizing, to provide the System Administrator with 
access to overwhelming force when needed, without compromising the Leviathan’s focus on 
traditional military operations. By separating these two aspects for future operations, neither 
function would be inadequately or improperly supported, and if this could be achieved, could it 
not potentially fix the overly complex mission that every soldier, however inexperienced, may be 
given in the current state of military affairs?  
By separating and restructuring the military into these dual roles to focus on operational 
capabilities and purposes, the DOD prevents confusion both within and outside the military over 
what a given soldier’s or unit’s purpose is and their place in the overall plan. Essentially the 
guiding principle for the coming decades, especially for the military, would be that the United 
States cease thinking of war in the context of war, and instead think of war in a broader context 
[economics/human security/political access/judicial impartiality/prosperity opportunities/et 
cetera], so that it does not become an end to itself or in conflict with America’s state building 
aims beyond individual battlefields. Parsing the structure in conjunction with the operation-
oriented reforms of Macgregor, better the military for an increasingly nuanced future marked by 
short conflicts and long post-conflict (re-)building periods?  
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This will become especially important in regard to military action, including the drone 
program and low-intensity conflicts ensuring a merited response, which is proportional and in 
line with long-term defense interests and accounting for the public response. Now that the issues 
of military armaments and force structure have been discussed, the continued reliance on 
contract employees will be examined first in why the US continues to use them as such an 
integral part to its actions and what will be needed for their optimal future use. 
Specifically what is necessary so that that they can compliment either military or civilian 
groups abroad without potentially undermining their efforts. Furthermore, while armed 
contractors will be the focus, as they have the greatest potential to undermine a mission as seen 
with the Blackwater [presently Academi of Constellis Holdings] 2007 Bagdad massacre, the 
problems and changes prescribed will benefit our use of all types of contractors. Neither 
contractors nor the discussion that follows it on armed drones are the only issues that may 
jeopardize these transformations for state building efforts. They are simply too large and all-
encompassing issues to be ignored; they will have a profound impact on the success or failure of 
above state building and corresponding changes.  
A Brief Historical Context of Civilian Contractors    
Use of mercenaries and civilians was common in Europe until the 1600s; they were also 
used, primarily in support personnel roles, during the American Revolutionary War. Although 
civilians still work in transportation, construction, food and medicine for the military in varying 
capacities, and were often locals, it was not until the Vietnam War that the military component 
transitioned into its present form. In March 1965, Business Week called Vietnam a "war by 
contract."
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 With the sudden advancements in standard military equipment, the military had to 
 41 
adapt. While there was no shortage of soldiers, they had limited technical training. This created a 
need for civilian contractors to compliment American soldiers.  
Maintenance crews from companies like General Electric, who put them in harms way to 
make field repairs and improve infrastructure. Also during much of the cold war the defense 
industry continuously expanded to offset military posturing by the Soviet Union. However, the 
rise of a specific subcategory of military contractor, those involved in supporting military 
operations, beginning in the late 1990s Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) began 
augmenting the deployment force. The reason being that for tasks of shorter duration, like Bosnia 
or Somalia, increasing the size of the military, growth lasting decades, makes less sense than 
outsourcing for a far more limited duration. Although the United States has the world’s largest 
military budget, it could no longer fully self-support in overseas operations.
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 Their use has 
greatly increased since President Obama took office.
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According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, America 
is no longer capable of conducting "large or sustained military operations" without heavy 
contractor augmentation.
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 In recent times, private civilian contractors have even exceeded US 
troops at times, and this shows no sign of abating, does the United States need to create systems 
that regulate the need to evolve so that they can continue being a part of American military 
without potentially undermining it.
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 Not only have there been high levels of corruption, 
mismanagement, fraud, and waste by military contractors over the last decade, instead of 
creating more comprehensive oversight and accountability, certain people within the US 
government continues to hold them un-accountable.
78
  
Better Future Integration and Control of PMSC     
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 Beyond the direct state changes, it is necessary to address the muddled legal issues 
pertaining to US government use of PMSC. In 1961, President Eisenhower warned, "We must 
guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the 
military-industrial complex." If America continues to be beholden to the deleterious effects of 
PMSC actions, could the other changes undertaken in conjunction to advance in the 
marginalization of terrorist groups be for not? The outsourcing of these traditionally military and 
security services is weakening the monopolistic control over the use of force that has been 
fundamental to and based on the sovereignty of modern states as encapsulated in the system of 
collective security laid out by the UN Charter. As the latest wars and conflicts have shown, the 
persistent impunity with which these companies operate may unnecessarily perpetuate potential 
damage, from their cavalier regard for civilians to the US military and its broad goals. This is 
especially true if the administrations both current and future are able to alter other US policy 
toward long-run global stability.
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Presently the laws at both national and international levels fail to make a determination as 
to whether such help are civilians or combatants or some undefined third category. The current 
support of the United States for the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal 
Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security 
Companies during Armed Conflict of 17 September 2008, does not fill the necessary legal 
vacuum in regard to PMSC due to it is a non-binding self-regulatory form built on existing 
international norms.
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 Also the foundational international conventions such as the UN Mercenary 
Convention do not extend to these legally registered entities, although US laws and regulations, 
was well as the Geneva Conventions and UN Convention Against Torture do. However for US 
laws only personnel but not the companies can be held responsible in either civilian or military 
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courts, but there are numerous barriers to doing so, including the procedure, contractor, 
classification of assignment, and political considerations. Internationally, if PSMC are more 
tightly regulated regardless of whether they are culpable in the distasteful acts displayed in mass 
media, those that are dismantling the hard fought reputation of PSMC to be seen as more than 
mercenaries will be held to the same standards as those that hold themselves to the military’s 
standards. To this end, if America were to push for the adoption of conventions such as those 
proposed by the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries, PMSCs would perhaps be set in 
a congruously applicable and enforceable legal system.
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 Closer to home, fixing the current 
legally opaque existence of PSMC that have resulted in a lack of accountability even to the US 
government will sustain the continuance and expansion of the “hearts and minds” tactic.  
In respect to contracts between the US government and PSMC, which detail the 
operational guidelines and for now remain mostly confidential presumably for trade secrets and 
national security concerns, outcry is dismissed. What if this were remedied to increase the 
release of PMSC contract operational limits, as doing so would not presumably harm operational 
capabilities pertaining to American interests in the majority of cases?  
            Particularly US citizens, in efforts to effectively promote state stability and 
marginalization of those who undermine, in the longer-term, such efforts will require a 
comprehensive legal system to ensure accountability, to protect aid workers and other non-
combatants. Specifically through more clearly delineated guidelines on what various groups may 
do. In particular when there are legal ramifications for working with organizations, people or 
governments that align either purposefully or negligently with those deemed to be terrorists, 
more precisely enumerating guidelines for what PSMC may do and not do on behalf of the US, 
third parties or in some cases foreign interests.  
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The US military, as well as its allies, will continue to outsource much of US foreign 
actions in both military and civilian operations, but in doing so it can no longer allow such 
companies to operate without placing checks on their power and their authority. The continued 
use of PMSC is useful for US operations, but only if it can be fittingly controlled and integrated 
into national security policies.  
 Now that the issue of contractors’ ability to undermine national and international efforts 
has been detailed. The second large threat to this shift toward state building is the use of armed 
Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) due to the civilian casualties, lack of public discussion, and 
the proliferation of potentially damaging information. Which collectively destabilize areas where 
they are currently used.   
Evolution and Current Drone Applications     
Since 9/11/01, the use of UAVs has continuously expanded in scope, frequency and the 
areas of operation. While only five percent can become armed drones, with a growing arsenal 
should the American state adopt a comprehensive legal and operational framework to retain 
control that may be jeopardized once other states have a greater stake in this? Since September 
2001, the overall inventory has increased from just 50 to 7,500 as of April 2012.
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 With the 
expanding use of armed drones, America can track potential targets for greater durations. 
Predator and Reaper drones can remain armed and airborne for over 14 hours. More traditional 
platforms have less ability to track for sustained durations; F-16 and A-10 aircraft can only stay 
aloft for up to four hours.
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 Furthermore, these surpass the responsiveness of the land-based 
platforms such as TBMs (theater ballistic missile). In certain military circles, this is known as the 
"find-fix-finish" loop. In addition, drones have the unique capability of redirecting launched 
explosives should civilians move into the target area.  
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 In August 1998, prior to the advent of armed drones, the US used a cruise missile salvo in 
a failed attempt to kill Osama bin Laden. Using this weapon, however, does not provide the near-
instantaneous response that came with UAVs. To launch these attacks it is necessary to predict 
where the target will be hours in advance, study pertinent intelligence, get presidential 
authorization and then program and launch missiles.
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 By transitioning to the UAV weapons 
platform the delay between intelligence confirmations, required authorization and the destruction 
of a target shortened. Furthermore through American aid both in humanitarian and security 
efforts the US has been able to benefit from host-state support to facilitate US drone operations 
both armed and unarmed.  
 There are numerous differences between drone strikes under Barack Obama and George 
W. Bush, in particular their use of armed drones in overseas operations. For example, the number 
of attacks has drastically increased over each of their predecessors, particularly in non-battlefield 
locations. In the wake of 9/11, President Bush authorized 50 such attacks, whereas President 
Obama authorized 350 as of last year.
86
 Throughout most of Bush's presidency, he reined in the 
drone program by only permitting attacks against particular persons, primarily those presumed to 
be of high value to al-Qaeda and its support network. By the end of his presidency, however, he 
authorized the start of the practice that would become known as signature strikes, or as the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has labeled them "crowd killing" or terrorist attack disruption 
strikes (TADS). Beginning in 2008, the US could target those who were suspected to be al-
Qaeda or Taliban leaders. This practice was expanded beyond Pakistan by President Obama to 
include Yemen.
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However, the increasing intensity of drone strikes since Obama took office is not the only 
difference. While the Bush administration, did not publicly speak on any aspects of the drone 
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programs. During the Obama administration, there have been efforts for greater transparency. In 
John O. Brennan’s April 30, 2012 speech, he said, "in full accordance with the law ... the United 
States government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qaeda terrorists, sometimes using 
remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones."
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 This development, however, has 
been limited, as a constraint from the past non-discussion, but the opportunity for 
more public discussion in Washington DC springs forth.  
Also in addition to much of the programs covert status, and the judicial justification 
for sustaining its secrecy, has barred exhaustive investigations into its efficacy. Resulting from 
this speech is the greater opportunity to examine one of the chief issues in the burgeoning public 
forum over the disparity between the supposed and actual targets of drone strikes. This 
distinction is important to make as the program is becoming more transparent. According to US 
officials, those targeted are limited to those who are an imminent threat. Included in this 
definition are "high-level al-Qaeda leaders ... planning attacks," those who are "specific senior 
operational leaders of al-Qaeda and associated forces" and other "individuals who are a threat to 
the United States" particularly those involved in planning attacks.
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 Back in December 2011, 
President Obama bragged, "twenty-two out of thirty top al-Qaeda leaders had been taken off the 
battlefield," all but Osama bin Laden were claimed to be due to drone strikes.
92
  
 In other words, he claimed that 73 percent of al-Qaeda leadership’s deaths had been due 
to counterterrorism operations, almost entirely those involving the drone program –that’s an 
impressive statement. Earlier in the summer of 2005 President Bush made a similar boast of 
success, in which he claimed that 75 percent of al-Qaeda’s leaders were either captured or 
killed.
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 However, multiple reports have concluded that the vast majority of the estimated few 
thousand dead were neither leaders of Taliban nor al-Qaeda forces. Indeed most were low-level 
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unknown, suspected militants who were probably only insurgents fighting their own country.
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The question that arises raises concerns that the part of the drone program, in which the United 
States eliminates non-high-value targets may not be sustainable, it may even undermine strategic 
US security interests, due to the level of uncertainty and overall scale both real and perceived. 
Although this drone warfare is far from settled, it has opened the way for changes in US policy 
to occur. However, if America is going to enhance its long-term capabilities then it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that there is an imminent deadline after which non-state and state actors, 
which both have an increasing stake in the outcome, could unduly affect the terms. While most 
capable countries have signed on to the Missile Technology Control Regime aimed at preventing 
the proliferation of armed UAVs, various countries are not signatories, also as it is not currently 
illegal to export UAVs so long as they are not used to attack another country; the will be 
exported at an increasing rate.  According to a number of analysts every country may have 
access to lower-end in terms of payload within five years, and a decade from now access to high-
end state of the art UAVs. Furthermore with China announcing the exporting of armed UAVs to 
Saudi Arabia, “you could soon have U.S. and Chinese made drones striking in the same region.95  
There are currently personality strike centric warfare investigations and a recent 
resolution by the United Nations into casualties from which the United States has abstained.
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Also, the European Parliament is developing a legal framework for armed drone use.
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Concurrently President Obama has publicly emphasized the need to re-evaluate and possibly 
reformulate the ways it conducts drone operations. In a speech on May 23, 2013 at the National 
Defense University he stated,   
America's legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a 
military tactic is [presently] legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in 
every instance ... over the last four years, my administration has worked vigorously to 
establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists -- insisting upon 
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clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy 
Guidance that I signed yesterday … [For instance] I’ve asked my administration to 
review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond 
our reporting to Congress.
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In the past year, there has been little progress about refining the unclear aspects of US 
drone use. About increasing oversight, the efforts have all but stalled out. Although the Senate 
Intelligence Committee quietly approved substantial changes to increase oversight and 
transparency, nothing has come of the bill. Changes in the bill were approved as a response to 
both domestic and international pressure. These changes included requiring the US intelligence 
community publicly to disclose yearly statistics on the number of injuries and deaths resulting 
from drone strikes including the proportion of non-combatant fatalities. There is also undisclosed 
language purported to increase scrutiny of decisions on targeting US citizens or residents in 
overseas strikes through an independent alternative analysis.
99
 Although as of April the Senate 
has stripped the bill of the requirement publicly to disclose statistics on targeted killings.
100
 Also 
in the past year Congress has been blocking, under partisan concerns and pressure from the 
intelligence community, Obama administration's attempts to consolidate the US drone programs 
under the singular authority of the Pentagon.
101
  
A number of senators also delayed John O. Brennan's CIA vetting to get access to Justice 
Department justifications for drone operations, constraining releases. One concern raised by 
commentators has been that the reluctance to provide greater transparency may result from the 
administration’s continuous remarks that the civilian casualties are minimal. Also, there is a 
perception of broader intransigence within Congress on other aspects mentioned by Obama, 
particularly the lesser public outcry over remote killing versus past detainment efforts.  
Over the last two years the number of supposed civilian casualties has decreased and the 
overall number of strikes this last year has also decreased, yet whether this is a result of President 
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Obama’s pledge or system-wide reform is presently unclear.102 Currently, the placations 
continue, in a recent statement, National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden spoke 
of White House exploration of sharing more information with the American people.
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 Whether 
anything will come from this, history indicates it will take months or years. In one promising 
move, President Obama and the Justice Department did not be appeal the ruling requiring the 
release of a redacted version of memos regarding targeting of American citizens including 
Anwar al-Awlaki without trial. Through the release of the redacted form of the memo, shoed that 
the Obama administration believes it had the right to kill Awlaki because he was a senior 
member of al-Qaeda and posed an imminent threat to the United States; furthermore, it was 
concluded that his US citizenship did not impose constitutional limitations that would preclude 
the lethal action.
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 Although this may prove significant, will substantial work not still be 
needed, to answer the unanswered questions including the reliance on the perceived veracity of 
statements from various federal agencies?
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 Far beyond promises, there has been no marked 
progress toward addressing international concerns. Also, unresolved are the effects of a 
proliferation on civilian casualties and challenges to international legal status quo.  
Reforming And Restricting Drone Use      
 As mentioned the United States conducts two types of drone missions. There are those, 
often termed “signature” strikes, in which the United States targets, known, often high-value 
terrorists; and there are those primarily happening outside traditional war zones, which target 
individuals who are unknown, called “personality” strikes. The latter, unfortunately, leads to 
high noncombatant casualty rates. This is a problem that is recognized both in the phrasing of 
casualty reports, which often list even unknown young males as combatants,
106107
 and the denial 
of involvement in such attacks when incendiary evidence to the contrary presents itself, 
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particularly in regard to Pakistan.
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 Further obscuring the situation is the use of the CIA is used 
for a particular strike in an attempt to create deniability either for America or the host country. 
Recently in an unusual move the US acknowledged its role in the Yemeni wedding processional 
deaths last winter, showing perhaps an effort to become more open? This is beneficial given the 
presumption that many of them already hold the US responsible for their loss.   
Is acknowledging America’s responsibility to admit when its operations result in civilian 
casualties an important first-step, and one that should increase in the future? If the United States 
does not do so, will this necessitate having to further reduce its operations, beyond present 
changes in these countries, to recover from the increasing strain on American remote killing, as a 
result of their current prevalence? Essentially if the United States were to take responsibility for 
both the positive and negative aspects of UAV attacks, would it, while having to bear the brunt 
of outcry and opposition to their general continuance, also allow for greater narrative control due 
to perceived transparency and accountability?
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In the vast majority of drone strikes, resulting in noncombatant deaths it has been US 
practice to distance itself, as stated, from the associated bad press. However, by acknowledging 
the intelligence failure and seeking to rectify it for the viability of subsequent drone strikes, 
America can start rebuilding its image in regions affected by such mishaps. Presently the United 
States only acknowledges that Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was responsible, 
when the news is positive or presumably because of the extensive photographic evidence of 
civilian injuries and deaths. 
In the other cases of DOD led strikes in Yemen even after the Yemeni Parliament passed a 
ban on drone strikes, the use under DOD control continued unabated. Moreover, while Yemeni 
executive leadership is collaborating in these actions, could continuing these strikes without 
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universally moving to more open practices, perhaps undermine US efforts to manage perceptions 
through increased accountability?
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 Also how effective are these changes, when other actions, 
for instance those by the CIA continue to result in ignored accidental deaths, it is not as though 
any drone strike occurs in a vacuum? Furthermore, while there is a reason for some denial, which 
is why the US uses the CIA in Pakistan where their government’s support is an issue, the scale of 
covert fully denied operations undermines that purpose and overshadows DOD disclosures.  
Should the media continue to be something to fear as shown in the cases of civilian deaths 
in Yemen, or should it become a partner that promotes the US’s successes and holds it 
answerable for its failures. By being more forthright in presenting its shortcomings, would the 
United States be able to more successfully shape perceptions of all its actions increasing overall 
support? In this respect, America could present facts including the fact that the civilian-to-
combatant kill ratio for drone attacks is lower than other forms of combat with the rate even 
when it first became a tool of US actions abroad, with one in five being a civilian death. Also, 
this is far lower than the one in three or even four out of five deaths in previous conflicts 
depending on which war is examined, and this ratio is improving daily with better intelligence 
acquisition.
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 Moreover, by increasing American openness in this respect, perhaps there will be 
a reduced pressure for the American government to disclose the drone strikes where there is a 
direct threat to intelligence sources. In this regard could the US increase perceived transparency 
and accountability toward the public and the international community, insuring that the 
information that is essential to ongoing operations does not come under threat? 
 These mounting concerns are, among other places, displayed in the many op-ed and 
editorial pieces in American papers, publications by numerous International INGOs, and the 
ongoing UN investigations into pertinent civilian casualties. The public, who clamor for a system 
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that seems more clear-cut and open, support this change. Moreover, the American public 
supports military drone strikes (75 percent) over those of the CIA (65 percent).
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 Would 
shifting the majority of drone operations to the DOD lessen the demands for pertinent CIA 
strikes information that presumably jeopardizes the important deniability? 
By restructuring the current system for drone usage, would the US government be better 
able to increase acceptance of their continued and ever expanding use? At present, drones are 
eroding domestic support and creating foreign ire as seen in news headlines from Yemen and in 
US changes to ground operations in Pakistan.
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 If America moves away from its 
unfavorable moral and legal justifications, will it be better prepared to formulate a transnational 
legal framework while its still the global leader in UAV use?   
Some people pushing for greater transparency argue that a reformation would facilitate 
exhaustive investigations and increased public disclosure, ensuring accountability in any cases 
where civilian casualties are suspected. Would this not at least reduce public outcry that 
undermines America’s self-righteous position? Beyond this damage-control campaign, can the 
US push for comprehensive international drone legislation that minimizes potential imminent 
operational constraints if it does not have a stronger foundation from which to advocate?  
This is apparent in the current impunity with which the covert drone-programs 
foment locals, and become a tool for al-Qaeda recruitment. Not only does one civilian death 
create a handful of potential recruits and at the very least possible future terrorist safe havens, but 
also it undercuts America's ability to use such locals for intelligence gathering efforts.
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 In recognizing the US’ responsibility to protect civilians, even outside acknowledged war 
zones could the United States successfully transition from straight warfare to longer-term state 
building efforts, even though in some instances this construction may be facilitated by a focus in 
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the immediate future on combat? Doing so syncs American rhetoric with its chosen actions and 
successfully shapes both the future of asymmetric operations under the umbrella of state stability 
and radicals' marginalization. However, it takes into account the more immediate narratives. 
Some features of these actions remain classified and unspoken; however, this is only so that all 
aspects remain viable. With the potential CIA to DOD leadership shift, the majority of operations 
could perhaps be more openly discussed and at least more easily accountable, but would this end 
up helping the CIA retain and possibly increase secrecy and deniability for its reduced number of 
operations and make it easier to operate in publicly hostile countries including Pakistan?
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Another reason besides optics and impacts on intelligence acquisition is CIA mission 
integrity; would this change clear up the currently murky congressional oversight resulting from 
differing reporting and oversight protocols between the CIA and DOD, and reduce certain types 
of actions in certain regards to maximize benefits from this change? The current differences 
between the two are quite complex. For clarification, there may be instances where the state may 
need to carry out covert actions to maintain secrecy. However, the primary and majority of 
strikes should be shifted to the DOD for the reasons enumerated above. Also as CIA director 
John O. Brennan stated in his February 2013 nomination hearing, "The CIA should not be 
conducting traditional military activities and operations."
118
    
In this development, could the CIA retain the capability, in a diminished capacity, to 
conduct drone strikes that would be feasible, ignorable by foreign leaders and prevent risky 
operations from being used as anti-American propaganda? Currently, the American government 
either remains silent or denies involvement when it unintentionally kills civilians. This results in 
propaganda efforts to curry support or sympathy by terrorist networks or states wanting to use 
US drone strikes covert presence as a scapegoat for their own airstrikes or as unfortunate 
 54 
tragedies in which either party can form an unflattering narrative.
119
 As former US Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld said, "While the enemy is increasingly skillful at manipulating the media and 
using tools of communications to their advantage, ... we have this advantage as well ... the truth 
is on our side, and ultimately, in my view, truth wins out."
120
 
However, if America wants to steer the narrative and prevent widespread propaganda 
efforts by its enemies, is it not necessary for the American-led adoption of a international legal 
framework specifically addressing UAV use? Perhaps doing this would improve US credibility 
enough to retain and expand support from the citizens and countries it relies on for support and 
intelligence, which are being influenced by opposing narratives. Through restructuring current 
efforts and leading this campaign, can American interests be given greater impact on the result, 
and make it possible to reduce the detrimental effects of America’s past and present ill-perceived 
actions, increasing operational security in addition to currying public favor?  
This growing need for America to help lay the foundation for an international framework is 
quite apparent, "Since 1942, the U.S. military has enjoyed an unrivaled capability to fight the 
nation's wars overseas" nonetheless, "precision-strike[s] will [eventually] proliferate into the 
hands of prospective American adversaries both large and small … This outcome could 
potentially constrain the United States' ability to project power overseas to the point of forcing a 
fundamental rethinking of America's role in the world."
121
 Although a profound change may 
indeed become necessary, when the US chooses to pursue this, will impact its influence over the 
result. Directly affecting either beneficially or deleteriously both drone and more broadly present 
and future US military capabilities that are integral to US foreign policy. Finally, while this is a 
complex problem, and the focus here is to potentially reduce the scale of the program in an effort 
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to curb un-desired deaths, does this shift in control not achieve this goal and the related concerns 
such as oversight and the public’s demands for limpidity?  
With this overview coming to a close, what has been learned? The current fragment largely 
military approach is not working. It is beneficial to increase and better incorporate civilian 
endeavors both governmental and non-governmental to create a comprehensive multi-faceted 
multi-temporal global approach. To fully realize this, the US military should be divided between 
the two different tasks so that neither attention nor resources are being split. Also to alleviate 
some of the burdens this could create a force structure that could be altered to downsize the two 
halves without undersized US forces in any capacity; perhaps other nations will eventually 
follow suit and further alleviate our burden. Finally, if state building is to be truly successful, the 
issues pertaining to the current use of contractors and armed drones must be satisfactorily 
resolved.   
A Better Future?       
What is being considered when America discusses these issues is whether the actions 
being taken have an effect, in particular do they enhance its al-Qaeda reduction capabilities, and 
its immediate, medium and long-term goals and the mechanisms necessary to advance them. Is it 
possible to create an environment, both politically and culturally, in which its citizenry is less 
fearful, more supportive of these progressions to their nation’s overall potential benefit? Also 
does this support extend to the majority of their citizens? If America can further and far more 
radically transform its capabilities and overarching policies to excise the disease of militant 
extremism, in particular al-Qaeda and its affiliates, it will address not only today’s problems, but 
those of tomorrow as well.  
“Although Americans today are increasingly skeptical of foreign engagement and global 
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responsibilities, it is a mistake to view those responsibilities as a burden or as charity,” as 
Defense Secretary Hagel recently said. “Let us remember that the biggest beneficiaries of 
American leadership and engagement in the world are the American people.”122 If these United 
States can achieve this multitude of essential changes, it can align the tools and tactics needed to 
achieve the US’ policy objectives. What will result will be change Americans and citizens of the 
world can believe in; not only the United States but the whole world will become a safer and 
more prosperous place in which terrorism is largely a remnant of our past. The author of this 
conception owes gratitude to the thinkers spoken of and referenced herein and hopes that justice 
was done to their ideas in this broader conceptualization. The aim of this paper was to bring 
together a number of important ideas to show what together they can become; hopefully this has 
been done.  
While the reforms spoken of herein are monumental in and of themselves, the United 
States — with the help of its allies — has brought about large-scale changes before to confront 
seemingly insurmountable challenges, and this can and should be done again. No state, not even 
America, can fully defend itself unilaterally against al-Qaeda, its affiliates and its allies. Even 
with reforms to the overall action to better correlate with dialogue, and more specifically 
transforming the military to better address actions undermining success, there is a necessity for a 
coordinated multi-tiered multilateral approach. As President Obama said in his speech in Cairo “I 
do so [recognize] that change cannot happen overnight,” but in the end al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
and those who shelter them can be marginalized into inconsequential obscurity and their status as 
an imminent threat to the United States and the world can be a problem of our past.
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